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BNA
CONFRONTATION

Potential Responses to the Melendez-Diaz Line of Cases
by presenting the report. Instead, the prosecutor must
present live testimony by a competent witness. Given
the volume of forensic laboratory tests, and the reliance
of many jurisdictions in recent years on the presentation of written reports rather than live testimony, it was
plain from the outset that the potential consequences of
this decision are quite significant.
In the course of litigating the case in the Supreme
Court, Massachusetts contended that, even if the lab report were considered testimonial, introducing it as part
of the prosecution's case-in-chief did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because the accused could, if he
wished, call the analyst to the witness stand as part of
his own case. The court squarely rejected that contention:
BY RICHARD

D.

FRIEDMAN

riminal prosecution is increasingly dependent on
proof of the results of forensic laboratory tests.
They are used, for example, to prove that a given
substance contains cocaine; to prove what a driver's
blood-alcohol content was; and to demonstrate that the
DNA profile of some substance found at the crime
scene matches that of the accused. Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have clarified that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause constrains the manner in
which prosecutors may prove the results of forensic lab
tests. This article discusses numerous coping mechanisms, several of unquestioned constitutional validity
and others raising additional questions, that jurisdictions may adopt in response to this line of cases.
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009), the Supreme Court resolved a question that had
divided the lower courts in the wake of Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Melendez-Diaz
court held by a 5-4 vote that forensic laboratory reports
are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause. Therefore, even if the jurisdiction's evidence
law poses no obstacle to admission of the report, the
Confrontation Clause prevents a prosecutor from proving the truth of an assertion made in the report merely

C

Richard D. Friedman is a professor at the University of Michigan Law School. He maintains The Confrontation Blog, www.confrontationright.blogspot.com, to comment on
developments related to the Confrontation
Clause.

Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause
shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows
from the State to the accused. More fundamentally,
the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the
prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.
Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a system
in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex
parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses.
Some thought that the Supreme Court might slide
back on this point given that, four days after the decision in Melendez-Diaz, it granted certiorari in Briscoe v.
Virginia, No. 07-11191. 1 But ultimately the court remanded Briscoe for proceedings consistent with
Melendez-Diaz. 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). Thus, Briscoe
need be of no further concern.
But other points remained to be resolved. In June, the
court decided Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011), involving a blood-alcohol test. In Bullcoming, unlike in Melendez-Diaz or Briscoe, the prosecution did present the live testimony of a lab analyst to accompany the report-but not the analyst who had performed the test and prepared the report. The analyst
who prepared the report was on unpaid administrative
leave, and the prosecution did not attempt to secure his
presence at trial. Instead, it presented a supervisor from
the same lab who was familiar with its procedures. In
the view of the same four justices who had dissented in
Melendez-Diaz (Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
1
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I represented the petitioners in Briscoe.
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Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and
Samuel A. Alito Jr.), that was satisfactory. But once
again a majority of the court held otherwise. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority, summarized the case this way:
The question presented is whether the Confrontation
Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial
certification-made for the purpose of proving a particular fact-through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or
observe the test reported in the certification. We hold
that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet
the constitutional requirement. The accused's right is
to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial,
and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to
cross-examine that particular scientist.
This is not yet the end of the story. Five days after deciding Bullcoming, the court granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505. Williams, which was argued on Dec. 6, is a rape case. Crucial proof of identity
was evidence of a DNA match: An expert witness testified in court that the DNA profile of the accused
matched one deduced from DNA found in material
taken from a vaginal swab of the victim shortly after the
crime. The testing on that material, and the deduction
of the profile, were performed by an out-of-state lab,
and no one from that lab testified at trial. Nor was the
report from the lab formally introduced into evidence.
The state supreme court distinguished Melendez-Diaz
principally on the basis that the report was used as the
basis for the opinion of the in-court witness as to the
DNA match. The petitioner claims that the substance of
the report was presented to the trier of fact and that it
was used for the truth of what it asserted, because if it
were not true it would not support the opinion of the incourt witness.
However the Supreme Court may decide Williams,
the question will remain as to what states and individual prosecutors may do to ensure that they comply
with the Melendez-Diaz line of cases and yet operate an
efficient and effective system of criminal adjudication.
Although prosecutors 'have tried to convince the Supreme Court that the requirements of the MelendezDiaz line spell practical disaster, states should be able
to comply with those requirements without undue burden. I tum now to potential responses to the MelendezDiaz line that criminal justice systems might adopt.
Most of these are clearly constitutional; a few, however,
pose significant constitutional issues.

1. Stipulations to Admissibility or to Result
At the outset, it should be noted that numerous jurisdictions have always operated on the assumption that,
unless the accused consented, the prosecution could
not prove the results of a forensic laboratory test without presenting the live testimony of a competent witness. This requirement has not caused a crisis, in significant part, it appears, because in a high percentage of
cases the accused will stipulate, if asked, to admissibility of the lab report. Most often the accused has no interest in seeing a live witness, or a succession of them,
testifying to inculpatory lab results. If the accused has
no interest in challenging the results of the lab test, he
might even be willing to stipulate to those results.
CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER
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This assertion is not mere hope; empirical evidence
backs it up. I have supervised performance of a study of
cases in Michigan, where, absent stipulation, a prosecutor wishing to prove the results of a test must bring in a
witness with first-hand knowledge of the performance
of the test. The results indicated that fears of a parade
of laboratory witnesses are considerably overblown: In
drug cases about .46 lab witnesses testified per trial, in
driving-under-the-influence cases about .55 lab witnesses testified per trial, and in rape cases in which
DNA evidence was presented, about 1.24 lab witnesses
testified per trial. 2
Why do counsel stipulate so frequently? The plus side
of demanding confrontation may appear minimal. Experience may compel counsel to recognize that the lab
reports will not be excluded; the prosecution will ensure that any necessary lab witnesses appear. Also, in
some cases the defense does not see much likelihood of
any worthwhile gains from cross-examination. And the
negative side of demanding confrontation may appear
substantial. For example, the defense's chance of reaching an acceptable plea bargain may be substantially impaired if counsel is perceived as game-playing in hopes
of imposing costs on the prosecution. 3 And the defense
may regard a live, perhaps very credible prosecution
witness as far worse than introduction of a piece of paper or reading of a stipulation.

2. Policy of Refusing to Stipulate When Witness
Appears
In some cases, even though the accused would prefer
that the lab witness not testify live against him, he insists that she appear, in hopes that she will fail to do so.
When the witness does appear, the accused then stipulates to admissibility of the report without live testimony. The deadweight loss of efficiency, for no good
end other than to demonstrate the ability and willingness of the witness to appear, can be considerable.
To some extent, the prosecution can guard against
this happening by announcing a policy that if the accused insists on the witness appearing live, and the witness does appear at trial prepared to testify, the prosecution will then insist that she do so live. Given that
the accused, by hypothesis, prefers admission of the report to live testimony of the witness, such a policy
might make the accused hesitant to insist that the witness appear live, especially where it appears very probable that the witness would indeed appear if required to
do so.

3. Imposition of Costs
Judge Lance Hamner of Johnson County (Indiana)
Superior Court has suggested imposing the costs of
laboratory witnesses' appearance on defendants who
are able to pay. He points out that, when a conviction
for a noncapital offense is obtained in a federal district
court, 28 U.S.C. § 1918(b) authorizes the court to order
that the defendant pay the costs of prosecution. And
costs include "[f]ees and disbursements for ... wit2
Is there a multi-witness problem with respect to forensic
lab tests?, available at http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
20 l 0/12/is-there-multi-witness-problem-with.html.
3
In his Melendez-Diaz dissent, Justice Kennedy argued
that it would be unprofessional for counsel to waive a client's
rights for fear of incurring judicial displeasure. I am putting
aside the possibility that counsel would act in that way.
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nesses," 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3), which may include, in addition to a per diem, travel and subsistence expenses. 4
Some states also allow the taxation of costs, including
witness fees, against criminal defendants.
Imposition of costs on the accused has considerable
appeal, because it might dissuade the defense from demanding the presence of the analyst simply to impose
costs on the prosecution or in hopes that the analyst
will not appear. But presumably costs can be imposed
only on the accused personally, not on counsel, and
only if the accused is able to pay, which may be a contested matter in some cases. Furthermore, the federal
cost-shifting provisions, though explicitly applicable
against criminal defendants, are invoked against them
only occasionally, not routinely. An accused might raise
the argument that use of such provisions as a regular
matter against defendants exercising a newly articulated constitutional right is an improper attempt to burden that exercise. The argument would gain force from
the fact that taxation of costs against criminal defendants was unknown at common law. I am not persuaded by the analogy drawing on the fact that an accused who is able must pay for counsel. In that situation, the accused is paying for his own counsel.
Similarly, the state may recoup costs from a formerly
indigent accused who later becomes able to pay the
costs associated with his own defense. 5 But the confrontation right is a passive right applicable to prosecution witnesses: the right of a defendant to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.

4. Simple Notice-and-Demand (or Demand-Only)
Statutes
The Melendez-Diaz court specifically endorsed the
constitutional validity of the simplest form of noticeand-demand statutes, explaining that these statutes
require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a
period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance
live at trial. See, e.g, Ga. Code Ann. § 353154.1
(2006); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.41, § 4
(Vernon 2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.51(C)
(West 2006) .... [T]hese statutes shift no burden
whatever. The defendant always has the burden of
raising his Confrontation Clause objection; noticeand-demand statutes simply govern the time within
which he must do so.
Note that under the notice-and-demand procedure, if
the defense makes the demand, the prosecution must
present the witness's testimony or suffer inadmissibility
of the evidence. In other words, if the defense makes
the demand, it is the prosecution, not the defense, that
(a) bears the risk that the witness does not appear at
trial, and (b) presents the witness's live testimony as
part of its case. Therefore, the simple notice-anddemand procedure does not create the problems, identified in Melendez-Diaz, that arise under a procedure of
the type advocated by Massachusetts and Virginia in
Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe, respectively.
4
See United States. v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
5 Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).

12-21-11

It is possible that a demand-only statute would also
be held constitutional in certain contexts. Under such a
statute, the prosecution does not have to give the accused notice of intent to offer a lab report in prosecuting one of a prescribed list of crimes, such as those involving drug possession; the use of such reports in prosecutions of this type is so common that the accused is
deemed to be on notice from the fact that he is being
prosecuted. As under a notice-and-demand statute, if
the accused wishes a live witness to testify, he must
make a timely demand, and if he does, the prosecution
must either present the live witness or forgo use of the
evidence. So long as (1) the statute is sufficiently clear
as to the consequences of failure to make a demand,
and (2) the crime is one for which use of a forensic lab
report would not be surprising, this type of statute
should not be constitutionally troublesome.
Some notice-and-demand statutes impose additional
requirements on the accused. The merits of these depend on the particulars of the requirements. For example, a requirement that at the time of making the demand the accused state an intention to cross-examine
the witness raises significant constitutional problems.
Ordinarily, the possibility that the witness will have an
unpersuasive demeanor on direct is a possible benefit
to the defense of live testimony. One might count that
possibility as of little importance in this context (compared with that, say, of a witness who observed the allegedly criminal event). But even if so, the defense
might have various good reasons to want to wait until
after the direct examination to decide whether to crossexamine. On the other side of the ledger, requiring a
statement of intent to cross-examine probably offers
negligible improvements in efficiency; legislatures
would be best advised to avoid including it.
By contrast, a simple requirement that the accused
assert that he is not making the demand simply to impose costs on the prosecution is probably acceptable.

5. Examinations Before Trial
As far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, if
the prosecution takes the testimony of the witness in
advance of trial, with the accused having had an adequate opportunity for confrontation, and the witness is
then deemed unavailable to testify at trial, the pretrial
examination may be introduced at trial in lieu of live
testimony.

( a) Depositions for the purpose of preserving
testimony
Depositions held for the purpose of preserving testimony offer significant advantages in terms of efficiency. A deposition may be scheduled to suit the convenience of the witness and of the parties; the witness
need not wait through unpredictable trial proceedings
to give her testimony. Indeed, a witness can feasibly
schedule several depositions in one day, minimizing
travel time-an important consideration if the witness's
lab is some distance from the courthouse. A deposition
may also be held close to the time when the test was
performed, meaning that the witness will be testifying
with a memory that is fresher than at the time of trial.
A deposition also ensures against the possibility that
the lab analyst will be dead or otherwise unavailable at
the time of trial.
Some caveats are necessary, however.
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First, unless the witness is deemed unavailable at
trial the Confrontation Clause precludes the prosecutor
fro~ introducing deposition testimony to prove the
truth of a proposition asserted in the testimony. But
given that the accused has had an opportunity to be
confronted with the witness at the deposition, courts
should probably be rather lenient in declaring witnesses unavailable, either because of their distance
from the courthouse or because of lack of memory of a
test performed long before.
Second, if the deposition is held too early, the defense might not know enough about the case to conduct
cross-examination adequately. With respect to many
types of lab reports, however, this will not usually be a
serious problem; defense counsel does not need to
know much about the case to know that it is bad for the
accused if the prosecution can prove that a substance
allegedly found in his possession is high-quality cocaine. An accused should be allowed to argue that in the
particular circumstances of the case the deposition was
too early to satisfy his confrontation right-but courts
should approach such arguments with considerable
skepticism.
Third, many cases settle on the eve of trial; the deposition may prove to have been wasted effort. (It is possible, though, that the deposition date, like a trial date,
will spur settlement efforts.)
Fourth, if the deposition is presented in the traditional manner, by reading a transcript, there is a significant loss of demeanor evidence. Jurisdictions might require, and in any event prosecutors might make it a
general practice, that depositions taken to preserve testimony be video-recorded.
The laws of most jurisdictions make it far more difficult in criminal cases than in civil ones to take a deposition for the purpose of preserving testimony. Under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a), for example, a party wishing to
depose a potential witness for preservation of testimony
must make a motion, which may be granted because of
exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice.
But laws of this sort can be amended to ease the standard for taking depositions.
The discussion above refers only to depositions for
the purpose of preserving testimony-not to depositions
taken (as allowed in some jurisdictions) for the purpose
of discovery. Given the different purpose of the latter
class of depositions, they should not be considered a
constitutionally adequate substitute for trial testimony. 6

(b) Preliminary Hearings
Preliminary hearings, in jurisdictions that hold them,
offer what the Supreme Court has deemed to be an adequate opportunity for confrontation. 7
Given that the preservation of testimony is not the
principal purpose of the preliminary hearing, an accused may regard this as unfair. An accused can protect
himself by asking whether the intention of the court
and the prosecutor is that he engage in a full crossexamination for purposes of preserving testimony. If
the court answers in the negative, then the accused cannot be charged later with having forgone an adequate
opportunity for confrontation. But if in the circumstances of the particular case the prosecutor wishes to
preserve the testimony, she might indicate that the de6
7

See State v. Lopez, 974 So.Zd 340 (Fla. 2008).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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fense ought to take advantage of the opportunity-thus
effectively transforming this portion of the hearing into
a deposition for preservation of testimony.

6. Remote Testimony
Some jurisdictions have experimented with testimony taken while the witness is at a location other than
the trial courtroom and televised to the courtroom. This
procedure offers the promise of great efficiency in the
context of forensic lab reports; an analyst can testify
from a studio adjoining her lab without ever leaving the
building.
It is open to question whether use of this procedure
over a timely objection by the accused would be held
constitutional in any circumstances with respect to lab
witnesses. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990),
the Supreme Court allowed video transmission of a
child's testimony on a case-specific demonstration of
likely trauma to the child. Craig provides at best weak
support for a rule allowing a lab analyst to testify from
a remote location via video transmission on grounds of
convenience-especially given that the continued vitality of Craig is in some doubt after Crawford. Moreover,
in 2002, the Supreme Court declined, over the dissents
of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Breyer, to transmit to Congress the proposed addition of a new Fed. R.
Crim. P. 26(b), which would have allowed video transmission of testimony when the parties were unable to
take a deposition. In a statement accompanying the letter announcing the court's refusal to transmit the proposal, Justice Antonin Scalia said:
Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect
virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones. 207 F.R.D. 89, 94.
Of course, the membership of the court has changed;
technology has continued to improve; and the court
may be more willing to allow a state to use video transmission, especially if it is limited to certain contexts,
than it was to propose a federal rule providing broad acceptance of such transmission. But the issue remains in
substantial doubt.
On consent of the accused, however, there is no serious constitutional obstacle to use of this procedure.
Given that the accused often consents to doing without
live testimony altogether, there is good reason to suppose that he would often be willing to have the witness
testify by video transmission, so long as the quality of
the transmission is good enough to allow an opportunity for cross-examination that is not significantly impaired.

7. SuffOgate Witnesses
Melendez-Diaz established that the accused has a
right to insist that the prosecution present forensic lab
results through a witness subject to confrontation, but
it left open the critical question of whom the prosecution must call. Though Bullcoming (like Melendez-Diaz
itself) is a 5-4 decision, it adds considerable clarity: The
prosecution cannot satisfy the Confrontation Clause by
presenting a lab report through an analyst from the lab
who had no role in performance of the test that is the
subject of the report.
Though the Bullcoming court declared that the accused has a right to be confronted with "the analyst
who made the certification," the same paragraph of the
opinion also contains a suggestion that in some cases
BNA
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another option is possible. The court said the question
was whether the report could be introduced "through
the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test reported in
the certification," and it held that "surrogate testimony
of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement." (Emphasis added.) The implication is that surrogate testimony of some sort is permissible. And if a
qualified laboratory worker who did not perform the
test or sign the report personally observed everything
that the author of the report related, then that observer
ought to be able to testify to the content of the report in
the same way that the author would have. It should be
made clear that the in-court witness is not the author of
the report and that the trier of fact is not being asked to
rely on the credibility of that author; redaction of the
author's signature might help make this point clear.
In many circumstances, it is not economically feasible to have an observer watch the performance of a
test. But in conducting autopsies, some jurisdictions
routinely have a second medical examiner present as an
observer. If necessary, the observer can testify at trial
as to the performance of the test, and she could testify
that the autopsy report reflects the facts as she recalls
them.

8. Retesting

~I
j

As indicated by Justice Ginsburg in Bullcoming, in
many cases in which the original analyst cannot feasibly appear at trial or for a deposition, the problem can
be addressed by having another analyst conduct a retest. In essence, the prosecution can generate a perfectly proper surrogate witness simply by having another qualified analyst, who can testify live reasonably
conveniently, replicate the original test. This will not always be possible. In some circumstances, tested material will have degraded to a degree making a retest impractical. And in some cases the original test will have
consumed so much of the material that a retest cannot
be performed. The latter difficulty has become less of a
problem with the advent of sophisticated DNA procedures that require very little material to test.
Retesting does, of course, entail some additional expense, but it need be incurred only when the prosecution believes the case is highly likely to go to trial and
the original analyst cannot appear.
In a situation in which presentation of lab results
would otherwise require multiple witnesses, retesting
can often provide a more economical solution: Proof of
the vast majority of lab results never need be introduced at trial. Thus, if proof concerning a given test actually does appear very likely to be introduced at trial,
repeat of the entire test by a single technician who can
testify live at trial will often be feasible even though
such complete vertical integration is ordinarily far from
the most efficient procedure for the test.
In the pending Williams case, there is no reason to
suppose that the state was unable to have a retest conducted by a single analyst who worked a convenient
distance from the place of trial and could, without much
difficulty, testify at trial to the conduct of the entire test.

9. Videotaping Performance of the Test
At least in the context of autopsies, videotaping the
performance of the test may relieve some problems of
proof. A continuous tape that showed enough of the decedent to be recognizable could demonstrate exactly
12-21-11

what happened at the autopsy without the need for authentication by anyone who actually was present at the
autopsy itself. Given the decreasing cost of videography, it may even be feasible to record the conduct of
other tests; if the sample is tagged or otherwise identified in a visible manner, it may be possible for a witness
who was not present at the performance of the test to
authenticate the video and so prove the conduct of the
test and the results.

10. Expert Opinion
If the prosecution presents satisfactory proof of the
results of lab tests and wishes to present testimony interpreting the results, it may do so through any qualified witness. The interpretive witness does not have to
be someone who participated in or observed the particular test or even someone who works at the particular lab.
If in drawing her opinion the in-court expert relies on
factual propositions that have not themselves been independently proven, then additional problems arise.
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides in part:
If experts in the particular field would reasonably

rely on those kinds of facts or data [i.e., those on
which the testifying expert has based an opinion] in
forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be
admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the
facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the
proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Most jurisdictions have rules comparable in effect. 8
Rule 703 can solve hearsay problems and other issues
of ordinary evidence law, but it is not a principle of constitutional law. Nor does this portion of the rule reflect
a traditional doctrine that might cast light on the original or longstanding meaning of the Confrontation
Clause; rather, it is a creation of the late 20th century,
of the pre-Crawford era in which the clause was given
little independent force, and it was a self-conscious expansion of common-law doctrine.
Accordingly, analysis of the situation in which an expert relies on facts not independently proven depends
in large part on the answers to two questions: Was the
8
The version of the rule presented above went into effect
on Dec. 1, 2011. It was adopted as part of the project of restyling the Federal Rules of Evidence. Between 2000 and 2011, the
corresponding portion of the Rule read:

If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject
[of the opinion], the facts or data [on which the expert
bases the opinion] need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed
to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
The last sentence of this version of the rule was added in
2000. Before that, the rule stood as it was originally adopted in
1975, apart from a gender-neutralization amendment in 1987.
The 2011 amendment, like that in 1987, was not intended to effect any change in meaning. Most states have adopted rules
based on one version or another of Federal Rule 703.
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statement by which the expert learned those facts testimonial in nature? 9 Is the prosecution trying to present
that statement to the trier of fact in support of the expert's opinion? (I speak of presentment to the trier of
fact, rather than formal admission into evidence, because it may be that, even if the statement is not formally introduced into evidence, the substance of the
statement was made known to the trier of fact. In such
a case, the better view is that the statement should be
treated as if it had been formally admitted. E.g., United
States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2011); State
v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541 554 (Minn. 2010). 10)

(a) Nontestimonial statement, not presented to
the trier of fact
If the statement by which the expert learned the
given fact is not testimonial, then there is no problem
under the Confrontation Clause. Thus, for example,
suppose a physician, before formulating an opinion,
makes a routine requisition for a blood test. Ordinarily,
there would be no reason to suppose that the lab technician who performs the test and reports on it has any
reason to suppose that she is doing so for prosecutorial
purposes. Accordingly, the report should usually not be
considered testimonial. Therefore, the only question is
whether the standard of Rule 703 is satisfied: Are the
facts reported of a type on which experts in the field
reasonably rely? If the facts satisfy that standard, then
the expert should be able to present an opinion based
on them.
(b) Nontestimonial statement, presented to the
trier of fact
If a nontestimonial lab report is introduced into evidence, the constitutional analysis does not change: The
statement is not testimonial, and so it lies outside the
Confrontation Clause. Because the statement is being
offered into evidence, it must satisfy the last sentence of
Rule 703. That will usually not prove to be a great
hurdle.
(c) Testimonial statement, presented to the trier
of fact
If the statement is testimonial-a conclusion that one
can expect courts to draw when the statement was
made in anticipation of prosecutorial use-then the
Confrontation Clause is potentially in play. Some courts
have taken the view that if the statement is presented in
support of the expert's opinion, then it is not presented
for the truth of what it asserts, and therefore the Confrontation Clause is not invoked. But the better view,
held by other courts, is that if the statement supports
the opinion only if it is true, then introducing the state9
The Melendez-Diaz court dropped a broad hint, 129 S. Ct.
at 2532 n.l, that documents prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance-such as certificates of calibration,
not prepared with reference to any particular run of a testwill likely be deemed nontestimonial.
10
As indicated below, I believe this is true even if the incourt witness does not disclose on direct examination that she
is relying on some source other than her personal observations
for the substance so conveyed. For a fuller discussion of this
and related issues, see my blog post, When is a statement presented for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?, at http://
confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/06/when-is-statementpresented-for.html.
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ment in support of the opinion is in effect introducing it
for the truth of what it asserts. The pending Williams
case may resolve the matter as a matter of constitutional law. Even if the Williams court holds that states
may allow testimonial statements to be introduced on
this basis, they should not take advantage of the opportunity, because it is a rather blatant evasion of the confrontation right.

( d) Testimonial statement, not presented to the
trier of fact
If the testifying expert formulates an opinion based
on testimonial statements and testifies to the opinion
without disclosing the statements or the information
contained in them, the Confrontation Clause is less
likely to be applicable. But if it becomes clear on crossexamination that the expert is relying on a testimonial
statement by a person who has not testified at trial, that
should suffice to invoke the clause; again, Bullcoming
may add clarity on this point. In any event, even without explicit disclosure it still may be that the trier of fact
would likely infer that the expert's opinion was based
on a statement to a certain effect. And even if this is not
so, courts should take care to prevent the expert's opinion from being used as a conduit to present repackaged
information contained in an undisclosed testimonial
statement.

11. Filling of Inferential Gaps
Bullcoming makes clear that the Confrontation
Clause does not allow a prosecutor to introduce a testimonial statement reporting on a given event or condition by presenting a witness who is subject to confrontation but who did not purport to observe the reported
event or condition. In appropriate cases, however, the
trier of fact may draw inferences as to a particular event
or condition even though no witness who observed that
event or condition testifies as to it.
Thus, if the prosecution needs to prove any occurrence in the lab, it will suffice to present the testimony
of a witness who did not actually observe that occurrence but who made observances from which the given
occurrence may be inferred. In particular, the prosecution does not have to have direct evidence as to every
second that the sample being tested was in the custody
of the lab. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.l. Some
gaps may be filled in by permissible inference. For example, if one technician gives a sample to another employee for safekeeping overnight, and the next day
takes the sample in the same apparent condition, the
prosecution is not obligated to produce the testimony of
the second employee.
Presumably there are constitutional limits to this type
of inference. If a police officer testifies that she seized
from the accused and delivered to the state police lab a
baggie with three small cakes of a white powdery substance, and a lab technician testifies simply that she
analyzed a baggie with three small cakes of a white
powdery substance and found that it contained cocaine,
that should not be enough to support an inference that
the material tested was that seized from the accused.
So long as the technician confines herself to what she
knows from personal observation, the problem in such
a case is not a Confrontation Clause violation; it is simply a lack of sufficient proof, which could lead to a due
process violation. But courts need to take care lest an
in-court witness attempt to cover such inferential gaps
BNA
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by testifying to factual inferences outside her personal
knowledge, indulging in the simple expedient of not revealing what her sources were. Suppose, for example, a
police officer was not at the crime scene but interviewed persons who said they were. She should not be
able to testify, "The accused stabbed the victim."
Whether the violation would be of the Confrontation
Clause itself or of due process, preventing such testimony is essential to protecting the confrontation right.
A similar problem may arise if a lab witness testifies
with no basis in personal knowledge, "The sample I
tested was that of the accused."
In short, the Constitution must create some demands
on the prosecution to provide adequate evidence of
chain of custody. The optimal rule in, for example, a
typical drug case may be something like this: The prosecution must present evidence in proper form sufficient
for the trier of fact to infer that the matter tested was
the same as the matter seized, and in materially unchanged condition; in proper form means that testimony supporting this proposition must be given by one
or more witnesses speaking from personal knowledge
and without revealing the substance of testimonial
statements that have not been subjected to confrontation.
Traditionally, many states have been unduly persnickety with respect to the chain of custody, and I believe that some still impose rules more restrictive than
the standard I have just enunciated or than any other
that the Supreme Court would plausibly impose as a
matter of constitutional law. Such states might consider
relaxing these standards.
Suppose, for example, that the prosecution provides
good evidence that a given bag, bearing precise identifying information and containing a sample taken from
the crime scene, was delivered to a forensic laboratory,
and an analyst from that lab wishes to testify to the results of a given test that she performed on the sample
she found in the lab. Suppose further that, for the testifying analyst to perform the test, the material first had
to be taken from the bag and subjected to a particular
process, but the testifying analyst did not perform that
step. I believe that, if the analyst wished to testify that
the usual procedure of the lab was to perform the process and return the material to the bag, the Confrontation Clause would not pose an obstacle, and neither
should state evidentiary law. Removing material from a
bag, performing a process on it, and replacing it do not
constitute a testimonial statement. Given the usual pro-
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cedures of the lab, it is a permissible inference that the
material was removed, the process performed, and the
material returned to the same bag.

12. Reorganization of Laboratories and Procedures
Some states have one central laboratory for forensic
testing. Although such an organization may be optimally efficient on the assumption that the technicians
will rarely have to testify at trial, it may be considerably
less efficient when the state is required to adhere to the
confrontation right as the Supreme Court has recently
recognized it. Over the long term, therefore, these
states may find it efficient to move toward the model of
those states that rely on several smaller labs distributed
around the state. They should, of course, take care to
make sure that such labs are able to perform their functions accurately and with reasonable efficiency.
Similarly, some labs rely heavily on a division of labor, which may be optimally efficient if the confrontation right is not taken into account and it is assumed
that technicians rarely have to testify at trial. Given that
some defendants will insist on their confrontation
rights, it may be more efficient to adopt a more vertically integrated system-that is, one in which fewer
technicians participate in the performance of any single
test. This is particularly true with respect to relatively
complex procedures such as DNA testing. In Michigan,
for example, usually no more than three technicians
participate in conducting a DNA test and the result, as
noted above, is that when DNA tests are introduced the
average number of lab witnesses who actually testify at
trial is 1.24, a very tolerable number.

Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Melendez-Diaz doctrine
imposes some costs on those jurisdictions that did not
previously adhere to the regime that the doctrine now
demands. Proving laboratory results by introducing a
piece of paper will make virtually any other method of
proof seem expensive by comparison. But some states
have always adhered to the constitutionally required regime, and their systems of criminal justice have not broken down. States should recognize that presenting forensic lab results invokes the constitutional rights of the
accused, and they should not attempt to undermine
those rights. Conscientious regard for those rights does
not preclude the states from adopting creative and efficient methods to cope with the newly articulated doctrine.
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